Paths of Love

‘It is [sic] can no longer simply be said that all those in any “irregular” situation are living in a state of mortal sin and are deprived of sanctifying grace. More is involved here than mere ignorance of the rule. A subject may know full well the rule, yet have great difficulty in understanding “its inherent values”, or be in a concrete situation which does not allow him or her to act differently and decide otherwise without further sin.’ (AL 301)
The theologians claim that this statement understood as meaning that a Catholic believer "can have full knowledge of a divine law and voluntarily choose to break it in a serious matter, but not be in a state of mortal sin as a result of this action", is heretical.
Amoris Laetitia seems to suggest, at least with the second part of the hypothetical "A subject may know full well the true, yet… be in a concrete situation which does not allow him or her to act differently and decide otherwise without further sin" that an individual may, due to being obligated in conscience to act a certain way ("does not allow him or her to act differently… without further sin"), not bear grave guilt in the violation of the "rule" that puts them in an "irregular" situation.
In this hypothetical, Amoris Laetitia is envisioning somewhat who is caught between two (perceived) obligations: the obligation of the rule in question, and the obligation of another rule that applies in this particular circumstance. For example, some one who married for a few years, without children, was divorced by the first spouse, has civilly remarried in ignorance of the fact that divorce cannot dissolve a valid marriage, been living in this civil marriage for many years and had children with the second partner, may come to learn of the indissolubility of marriage and the consequent obligation of fidelity to the first spouse, yet at the same time believe themselves bound by the grave obligation of justice to their second partner (including sexual giving of self to the partner). Such a person, caught between two apparent divine obligations, may discern in conscience that their greater obligation is to the current partner; the argument of Amoris Laetitia implies that such a person does not thereby necessarily commit a mortal sin.
One might quibble about whether such a person really knows "full well" the rule, but that is more an argument about words than a substantial argument about the matter in question.
The two major points one might raise are: is it possible, without grave fault, to believe that one divine law obliges one to break another divine law? In general St. Thomas Aquinas held that ignorance regarding divine law was culpable, and so, in speaking about the case of a perplexed conscience, which obliges a person to do something contrary to divine law, he argues that a person, so long as they are in that ignorance, sins by disobeying their conscience, since they do not follow the divine rule as it is presented to them by their conscience, and likewise sines by following their conscience, since they do not follow the divine rule that they should have know. He does make exceptions for insane persons, who are not capable of any moral action, but it is not clear whether he would make any further exceptions. However, considering the various external factors that lead someone to accept something as a moral obligation, it seems necessary to admit that in some cases, ignorance regarding divine laws may be not gravely culpable. If this is true, someone who erroneously believes that he is bound by a "higher" (as far as he perceives it) divine law to disobey another divine law, would be inculpable. One may not be obliged, by catholic Faith, to believe that there are such cases. But it is not in the least heretical to hold that there are; and indeed, this very statement of Amoris Laetitia provides a reason, based on church authority, to hold that there are, even if a small reason considered in itself.

The first part of the hypothetical "may… have great difficulty in understanding 'its inherent values'", I find harder to interpret, and potentially more problematic. But whatever exactly is meant by understanding "its inherent values", it seems to imply at any rate not really having "full knowledge" of a divine law in a morally relevant sense. I may come back to this, if I think I have something enlightening to say about a relationship between "knowing a rule" and "understanding its inherent values".

‘It is [sic] can no longer simply be said that all those in any “irregular” situation are living in a state of mortal sin and are deprived of sanctifying grace. More is involved here than mere ignorance of the rule. A subject may know full well the rule, yet have great difficulty in understanding “its inherent values”, or be in a concrete situation which does not allow him or her to act differently and decide otherwise without further sin.’ (AL 301)
The theologians claim that this statement understood as meaning that "a person with full knowledge of a divine law can sin by choosing to obey that law", is heretical.
Taken as an ordinary person would take it, this is most certainly not heretical. Indeed, St. Thomas Aquinas and, after him, most moral theologians, recognize the case of someone obliged by their conscience to do something contrary to a divine law; this is in fact a classic case of a "(qualifiedly) perplexed conscience". (E.g., in de Veritate, q. 17, a. 14, objection 8 and response, Aquinas considers the case of someone whose conscience obliges him to commit fornication, and in Quodlibetal 3, q. 12, a. 2, of a heretic obliged in conscience to preach against the Catholic faith.) While some theologians of his time argued that such a person was not obliged to obey their conscience, St. Thomas Aquinas argues that such a person is obliged to obey their conscience, and sin if they do not, at and the same time, they sin if they do obey their conscience, by acting on an erroneous conscience that they should have corrected. Aquinas notes that such a person is not absolutely forced to sin, only conditionally, so long as they do not correct to conscience. Just as, so long as someone accepts a false principle as the basis of his thought, he cannot avoid error, so, so long as a person persists with an erring conscience, he cannot avoid sin. (ST I-II, q. 19, a. 6, ad 3) This teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas is taught by the Catechism of the Catholic Church: "A human being must always obey the certain judgment of his conscience. If he were deliberately to act against it, he would condemn himself." (CCC 1790)

One could say that the theologians' claim is technically correct, since, if a person's conscience tells him that he is obliged to do something incompatible with obeying a certain divine law, though he will sin if he disobeys his conscience and obeys that divine law, it would not be by choosing to obey that law that he sins, but by disobeying the law that his conscience puts forth as the reason why he is obliged to do something else. But, if our concern is with what Amoris Laetitia intends to say, or with how an average reader will take it, this technicality seems not to be really relevant. Under the given circumstance, if he chooses to obey that divine law, he will be sinning.

Continuing the translation from Josef Seifert's article in German, released under the Creative Common's License with Attribution CC BY 3.0). Complete translation (still in progress), on a single page: The Joy of Love – Joys, Anguish, and Hope – by Josef Seifert.

2.1.3 Some few (or many) "irregular couples", who live in objectively sinful situations — only after an examination in their personal conscience (with a priest's help or alone)?

According to this third interpretation of AL, that put forth by Rocco Buttiglione and others, the couples meant by AL as those who could receive the sacraments would be: couples who live in adultery or other grave sins, but who, on account of their limited ethical understanding or weakness of will “good adulterers”, or, put more generally, those who are “only objectively, but not subjectively sinners”, who indeed by reason of their subjective state are “sinners in a state of grace”. For such couples the sacraments could be a help on their journey in the spirit of the Gospel. In this case the invitation to receive the sacraments would be limited to certain, perhaps few couples in “irregular situations.”

2.1.3.1 A logical fallacy that we need to avoid

We could see a certain logical fallacy in Amoris Laetitia and in certain of its defenders, such as Rocco Buttiglione and Rodrigo Guerra López, concerning the assumption that many “couples in irregular situations”, who objectively live in grave sin, could for subjective reasons be inculpable. We could formulate the fallacy as follows:

• 1. To commit a grave sin presupposes the knowledge that what one is doing is a grave sin.
• 2. Many divorced and remarried persons do not know that they commit a grave sin when they (without the annulment of the first marriage) marry again.
• 3. Therefore, many divorced and remarried persons do not commit a grave sin in marrying again.
• 4. (Therefore, they live, if they have not committed another grave sin, in the state of grace and we should admit them to the sacraments.)

The fallacy is based on an equivocation regarding the expression „knowledge“ in the first and the expression „do not know” in the second premise, as well as the fallacy of a tacit (false) presupposition.
The tacit false presupposition is that one cannot be guilty, indeed gravely guilty for one’s lack of knowledge or one’s ignorance and for one’s own moral blindness, and that therefore no one who doesn’t recognize his own sin as such commits a grave sin.

Certainly what the Catechism of the Catholic Church says is true:

1859 Mortal sin requires full knowledge and complete consent. It presupposes knowledge of the sinful character of the act, of its opposition to God's law. It also implies a consent sufficiently deliberate to be a personal choice.

But the same number 1859 of the Catechism continues:

Feigned ignorance and hardness of heart [Cf. Mk 3:5-6; Lk 16:19-31] do not diminish, but rather increase, the voluntary character of a sin.

1860 Unintentional ignorance can diminish or even remove the imputability of a grave offense. But no one is deemed to be ignorant of the principles of the moral law, which are written in the conscience of every man.

Among these things are adultery, murder, etc. Therefore we cannot assume an inculpable ignorance of the evil of murder or adultery, because there is no such thing as inculpable ignorance of the moral law that God has “written on the heart”, as the Catechism of the Catholic Church (Nr. 1860) says.

Consequently, the second premise of the syllogism is false, since a man, under normal circumstances (if he is not psychically gravely ill or something similar), in an original intuitive knowledge always knows about the moral evil of adultery, since the natural moral law is “written” (belongs to man’s natural moral reason) on the heart / conscience of man. There is a kind of deep, not always reflectively known, and often repressed knowledge, that is enough to make a man gravely guilty, even if he does not consciously recognize this knowledge.

In reference to the sin of idolatry, which Paul describes as “inexcusable”, it is said in Romans 1:21-23:

“For although they knew God they did not honor him as God or give thanks to him, but they became futile in their thinking and their senseless minds were darkened. 22 Claiming to be wise, they became fools, 23 and exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling mortal man or birds or animals or reptiles.” (Rom 1:21-23).

Now we can recognize the aforementioned equivocation as cause of the error. If one (without guilt) does not know that one commits a sin, one cannot commit a sin. But if, e.g., because one has deadened one’s conscience by many unrepented murders, is blind to moral values and no longer recognizes the evil of one’s actions, this is no inculpable ignorance, that would acquit a man of grave sins.

Dietrich von Hildebrand proved this by profound philosophical analyses, distinguishing four kinds of blindness to moral values, which for various reasons are culpable, sometimes gravely culpable, when, for instance, they follow from repeated unrepented evil deeds, by which the sinner dulls his conscience (blindness of obduracy). Ethical blindness can also occur because someone has a strong affection for what is subjectively satisfying, and at the same time does not want to consciously sin, but has a limited will to act morally uprightly, which easily leads him into the blindness of classification, in which he doesn’t classify his own behavior as an instance of the adultery or murder recognized as per se evil.

Or he is subject to a partial actual value blindness, no longer recognizing as such moral demands that forbid his particular vices, etc.

Paola Premoli De Marchi, in an outstanding book, applied the results of these analyses and the roll of freedom in knowledge in an original manner to a “ethics of consent” and developed it substantially and uniquely.

For the aforesaid reasons can we in no way validly conclude that the many divorced and remarried persons, who are blind to their own sin, are inculpable or live “in the state of grace.”

2.1.3.2 Is this "discrimination" between "evil adulterers and homosexuals" and "inculpable/good adulterers or homosexuals" tenable and practicable?

Is such a differentiation a practicable solution? I believe that the attempt to put it into practice leads to insurmountable impossibilities and difficulties. With regard to the unequivocal cases of adultery and bigamy, who shall distinguish, on a case-by-case basis, the good and inculpable adulterers or homosexuals and the evil adulterers or homosexuals (those in a state of grace and those living in grave sin)? On what basis?

AL says (even if not unequivocally), the distinction between „subjectively good adulterers“ (in the state of grace) and „evil adulterers“ (who live in mortal sin and therefore, according to the code of canon law, may not be admitted to the sacraments, if they persist in their non-marital cohabitation) should take place with the approval of a priest or confessor.

Here is the question: How can that work? Should priests declare some couples who live in adultery guiltless and tell them that in their case the reception of the sacraments does not require conversion or giving up their adulterous relationships, and that they can receive sacramental absolution from their sins and living communion with the Church without repentance and without the resolve to amend their life and to live as brother and sister? And other couples, on the other hand, who were true adulterers, may in no event receive the sacraments without the firm resolve to distance themselves from sinful, adulterous relationships, and to live in complete continence? Is it not manifest the discord and the private and public scandal that would arise, when different adulterous, in concubinage, lesbian or homosexual couples get contrary answers from the same priest? Is it not moreover clear that only a priest who had the gift of seeing souls could undertake this work of distinction? Is it not, further, evident, that many couples in “irregular relationships” would seek a “merciful” priest, who would give them the sacraments, and if he did not give them permission, would report such a confessor or at least make a complaint against him and other “cruel” priests, “who sit on the chair of Moses”? Are not immediately evident the catastrophic pastoral consequences of such a discrimination and disunity among priests that would arise from such a “new order”, which Spaemann fittingly called “chaos as a principle”? So, since evidently priests cannot make such distinctions, shall we leave such judgment to the conscience of each individual couple? But to leave this judgment to each couple and each individual, who shall now be judge over themselves and their state of grace, although they knowingly live in grave sin, is that not a pastoral catastrophe?

2.1.3.3 Is there no risk of sacrilege, if couples in adulterous, bigamous or homosexual relationships receive Holy Communion or sacramental absolution of their sins without the intention to change their life?

If the Holy Father Pope Francis wants to allow civilly remarried couples to receive the sacraments, why is there in AL not a single word of warning about the real danger of committing sacrileges, if adulterous, bigamous or homosexual couples receive Holy Communion? Why, in 260 pages, is the Word of Scripture not mentioned a single time, that “no adulterer shall enter the kingdom of heaven”? Why, in this context, is there not a single word confirming what Paul says, that “he who unworthily eats the Body and drinks the Blood of Christ, eats and drinks judgment unto himself”? Would it not be merciful to recall this truth to “irregular couples”, rather than telling them that they are “living members of the Church”? If a change in the sacramental discipline of the Church allows couples, who objectively live in so grave sin that until recently they were subject to excommunication, to receive the sacraments, then the complete silence regarding the real danger “to eat and to drink judgment unto oneself by the unworthy reception of the Eucharist” is beyond understanding. This very serious, horrible danger is certainly present, if couples who live in adultery or other grave sins such as concubinage or homosexual relationships, receive Holy Communion. And if the words of Sacred Scripture say that there is such a danger for souls, not to mention this with a single syllable or even point-blank to deny it, virtually invites couples, who live in objective contradiction to the Church, to persist in this contradiction. And if they, moreover, are assured that “no one will be condemned forever,” this is, I think, no act of mercy. What else could it be than an act of cruelty? Much crueler than it would be to leave a passenger boarding a ship in ignorance of the face that he will very likely soon die, since the ship has a large leak and could easily sink?

I therefore consider it necessary, for the sake of the holiness of marriage and the Eucharist, and for the sake of the eternal life of the faithful, for the Holy Father himself to remind us all that we should guard ourselves from this danger. Concerning the observation of Pope Francis, that not every divorced and remarried person is subjectively living in grave sin, but could rather, on account of his ignorance, have acted with a clean conscience and so live in the state of grace: I do not deny this. Much less do I deny that for such a person the reception of Holy Communion could be spiritually fruitful.

Nonetheless we should not lose sight of two things: (a) we cannot assume that this is the normal case of a divorced and remarried couple, and (b) it must be clear that neither a normal priest nor an individual person in this circumstance can know this or claim it with the least confidence to its being the truth. Therefore, everyone who objectively is living in grave sin should so live and act, as though he were subjectively living in sin.

2.1.3.4 Appeal to sinners to convert, or confirmation that they are living members of the Church?

It is certainly true and can be a great comfort, for these couples to know that God’s mercy is always present and ready to forgive them and to say to them: „Neither do I condemn you.” But we should not forget the following words of Jesus: “Go, and sin no more.” Besides, if the conversion from sins is absent, then a (evil) civilly remarried divorced person is no longer a “living member of the Church” and is not “on the way of life and the Gospel.” If he does not convert, the Father’s word about the lost son apply to him: “Your brother was dead,” although the way to confession and repentance always remain open to him. And for the one who chooses that way, the word applies: “Your brother lives.”

2.1.3.5 Why risk blasphemy and public scandal rather than teaching divorced and remarried faithful who are subjectively free of mortal sin and live in a state of grace the blessing of spiritual Communion?

Furthermore, to avoid the great evil of a sacrilege and a public scandal, without depriving divorced (and without certification of nullity) remarried persons of sacramental grace, one could teach couples who are perhaps by reason of the purity of their conscience in a state of grace, the possibility of “spiritual Communion.” They could inwardly ask God to grant them “spiritual Communion.” This proposal of Cardinal Kasper regarding spiritual Communion of divorced and remarried gave rise to a controversy. The argument made in this controversy, that everyone who can receive spiritual Communion, can also receive sacramental Communion, suggests the equation of sacramental and spiritual communion.

The controversy, and in particular this suggestion, demand clarification, which Johannes Stöhr, e.g., makes.

Without offering a refined theological explanation, which would be beyond my competence and exceed the limits and the goal of this article, I would just like to make the follow notes. Following Stöhr, we can distinguish:

• 1. One meaning, which Stöhr calls the principal meaning of spiritual communion, consists in the abiding inner communion with Christ after the worthy reception of sacramental communion – perfection of sacramental communion together with lasting effects in the soul. That means, in turn, frequently repeated acts of devotion. I do not refer here to this meaning, since it is only applicable to couples who are allowed to receive the sacraments.
• 2. Different from that is the desire of a Christian to receive sacramental communion when this is for compelling external reasons not possible, e.g., on account of sickness, professional duties, belated recollection of the law of fasting, etc. It means, however, not only not the same bodily nearness to Christ as the reception of the sacrament, but is, as a mere desire, not even like the sacrament, as our fourth kind of “spiritual communion” is.
• 3. Sometimes what is meant is the desire to receive, although there is an objective impediment. In this connection one could have the unchristian notion, that spiritual communion in this case could be a substitute for sacramental communion, it could actually be possible for all. Stöhr is completely justified in criticizing this notion. To Stöhr's distinctions I would add further meanings of “spiritual communion” that seem to me to be the most important in our context.
• 4. We could understand spiritual communion not as the mere desire for sacramental communion, when the latter is for external reasons not possible, but as a kind of spiritual-mystical communion, which doesn’t mean the real bodily presence of Christ of sacramental Communion, as Stöhr rightfully remarks, but that is much more than a mere desire. We can certainly not exclude that, even when the form and matter of the sacrament, that God effects and bestows a spiritual and quasi-sacramental union with Him, which bestows no less graces than are received by someone who receives communion with a lukewarm heart or out of routine. Indeed, according to the measure of love of the communicant, the opus operantis, more grace and a deeper union with God may be bestowed on such a “man of desire as Daniel” than on someone sacramentally communicating with a lesser yearning and love. And no man can determine the measure or the limits of the union, that God can bestow on one spiritually communicating in this way.

According to the interpretation of AL made by Rocco Buttiglione, the persons meant by Pope Francis are first of all such as objectively live in a state of grave sin, but on account of the imperfection of their knowledge and will still live in a state of grace. And that there are such persons, who only outwardly fall into Stöhr's third category, while inwardly belonging to the second group of persons he names, who, in other words, despite their objective sinful actions do not inwardly live in grave sin, is, with AL (and Thomas Aquinas) indisputable. And it is these persons, and also the fourth group of persons I distinguish – those who by reason of a “marriage of conscience” live in “irregular situations” – that I mean, when I speak of the gift of spiritual communion, to which these persons can have access. A prerequisite, to be sure, is that they do not consciously and willingly commit grave sin, but for subjective reasons, despite their objective sin, are not subjective grave sinners. And such persons, who in my opinion one should still exclude from sacramental real Communion, can, if they truly live in the state of grace, receive the graces of a spiritual-mystical Communion (in the fourth sense) – entirely without the danger of sacrilege, that presupposes the physical-real presence of the Lord.

Otherwise, if divorced and remarried persons are objectively as well as subjectively living in a state of sin, one may not say that they are „living members of the Church“, without renouncing their sins of adultery or homosexual acts. Their sacramental Communion would cause public scandal and would decrease, for them, and for others, reverence for the Most Holy Sacrament. For these reasons, and the reasons given in the next section, we should ask the Holy Father to revoke the admission to the sacraments of couples who objectively live in grave sin.

Continuing the translation from Josef Seifert's article in German, released under the Creative Common's License with Attribution CC BY 3.0). Complete translation (still in progress), on a single page: The Joy of Love – Joys, Anguish, and Hope – by Josef Seifert.

2.1.2 All „irregular“ couples: divorced, adulterers, lesbian and homosexual couples?

Many persons interpret the couples, who materially are living in grave sin, but who now by AL shall be welcomed at the Lord’s table, in a form completely opposite to the first answer: “All divorced and remarried persons, adulterers, lesbians and homosexuals, bisexuals and other couples should be admitted to the sacraments without any restrictions.” Fr. Antonio Spadaro SJ, the Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines through its president, and many German bishops, but also US bishops such as the Archbishop of Chicago, Blasé Cupich, have interpreted AL in the same sense. The same applies to Cardinal Schönborn, who in an interview went so far as to say that Pope Francis, at least as regards the reception of the sacraments, had eliminated every distinction between regular and irregular couples. (cf. Schönborn, July 6, 2016)

This interpretation of the couples, who should be admitted to the reception of the sacraments and draw help and graces from them, not only contradicts Familiaris Consortio 84, is not only the negation of that which FC and many other documents teach. It is the radical, contrary and absolute opposite of the traditional teaching.

If instead of none, now all adulterous, homosexual, lesbian and promiscuously living couples shall be invited to the sacraments, there are truly no more limits, as Fr. Spadaro assures us. Why not administer the sacraments to couples, nurses and doctors, who through abortion or assistance thereto have been automatically excommunicated?

If one were to put the explanation and practice of the sacraments in line with this interpretation and its pastoral consequences, one would desecrate the holy temple of God, indeed one would transform it into a temple of Satan and a horrible site of every Eucharistic sacrilege and blasphemy. In view of such an interpretation of Amoris Laetitia, which stands in stark contradiction to the repeated papal request for Eucharistic adoration, I believe it is extremely urgent to clarify that this neither is nor can be what the Pope intends, but a completely false interpretation and a total misapprehension of the meaning of AL. It is quite clear from the text of AL that this is a false interpretation of AL.

Still, in view of the fact that this interpretation is advocated by Bishops’ conferences, Fr. Spadaro, cardinals and archbishops including Archbishop Cupich, who was recently promoted to membership in the Congregation for Bishops, a very clear papal explanation that this interpretation of the words of AL is a radical misunderstanding is urgently necessary and must be given as soon as possible, if one wants to prevent total chaos.
A further reason urges this, namely that the offering of the holy sacraments to all (even granted that this understanding of AL is incorrect, as I believe it is) seems to be supported by the following words of AL:

„297. It is a matter of reaching out to everyone, of needing to help each person find his or her proper way of participating in the ecclesial community and thus to experience being touched by an “unmerited, unconditional and gratuitous” mercy. No one can be condemned for ever, because that is not the logic of the Gospel! Here I am not speaking only of the divorced and remarried, but of everyone, in whatever situation they find themselves.”

When one, moreover, considers the Holy Father’s silence in reaction to this interpretation by the Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines, and the fact that Fr. Antonio Spadaro, S.J. was a close collaborator in working on the text of AL, it is difficult to call into doubt what he says about AL (unless the Holy Father explicitly excludes this interpretation, which all bishops and faithful should humbly ask him to):

„The exhortation, following the synod's concluding document, goes the way of examining individual cases, without setting any limits to integration, as was formerly the case.“

This silence of Pope Francis strengthens the false and scandalous second interpretation of who, according to AL, the couples are, who should be admitted to the sacraments, above all when one considers that it is in no way a general tendency of Pope France to let everything go its way, without making public corrections. Thus the Pope, a short time ago, immediately and publicly corrected the impression that had arisen with many persons, that the simple invitation of Cardinal Sarah, motivated by noble liturgical considerations, that priests, as a way of meditating on the deepest goal of the liturgy (the glorification of God), should more frequently celebrate ad orientem (versus Deum), announced a change of the liturgical norms of Paul VI, according to which the Holy Mass should normally be celebrated versus populum. (In reality this norm was never absolute, and moreover was in part modified by the Motu Proprio of Pope Benedict XVI on the right of all priests to celebrate Holy Mass in the Extraordinary Rite (sic)). This immediate and very public critical reaction (which I regret), by the Pope to a mere, very beautiful suggestion of Cardinal Sarah, which was completely in his area of competence and moreover only recommended something that is allowed to priests anyway according to the currently valid norms for liturgical celebration, gives the world all the more reason to believe that when the pope is silent regarding the scandalous second interpretation of “couples in irregular situations” (who objectively are living in a state of gave sin) who now should without distinction be invited to the sacraments, his silence indicates his consent to this interpretation.

The same thing applies to the pope’s silence regarding the newest interview of Cardinal Schönborn in Corriere della Sera, in which the Cardinal, whom the Pope declared to be the most competent interpreter of AL, made the unbelievable claim that Amoris Laetitia had completely eliminated the distinction between “regular” and “irregular” couples. (This corresponds exactly to the interpretation that according to AL there is no restriction on the couples who are to be allowed to receive the sacraments, and in addition imputes to AL, that it puts marriage on the same level as concubinage, adulterous and homosexual couples.)

Many persons must think that the papal silence regarding this interpretation is a sign of papal consent. Without the promptest reaction of the pope to these interpretations the whole world must be that Francis supports this second interpretation of “couples in irregular situations” (in a state of grave sin).

Pope Francis seems, moreover, to encourage this second interpretation of the couples who should be admitted to the sacraments, by his recent appointment of Archbishop Cupich as member of the Papal Congregation for Bishops. For Archbishop Cupich defends this second interpretation regarding the admission to the sacraments more radically than any other American bishop, indeed he publicly distributes the Sacrament of the Eucharist to politicians, who for their support of abortion are automatically excommunicated, and, to top it all, defends this interpretation of AL by calling this document a radical “rule-changer” and considers it a good thing to distribute Communion to public advocates of abortion, a crime punished by excommunication (and forbids the priests of his diocese to take part in a march for life and in public priests for the abolition of abortion laws).

I therefore call on all Catholics, urgently to implore the Holy Father in the name of God and of the souls deceived by such false and scandalous interpretations of AL, to very soon make such a clear statement, to hinder a spiritual catastrophe and sacrilege without end in God’s sanctuary and as far as possible, to stop a total confusion among priests and faithful.

It is impossible that the Pope teaches this. Still, I believe, that reducing the complete chaos that has arisen from this interpretation and its high ranking advocates in the church, presupposes that the pope himself exclude this second answer with the strongest expressions possible and publicly declares in a commentary to AL: “It is false to maintain that it is a correct interpretation of AL, that all who live in concubinage, adulterous, homosexual, lesbian, and all other “irregular” couples are invited to the Lord’s table before they convert!”

I believe that this interpretation of the text of AL is untenable, not only because it simply cannot be that a Pope should teach such monstrosities, but also because Pope Francis in AL speaks of a testing and an examination, ideally with a priest, which should precede the reception of the sacraments by such priests.

This brings us to the third understanding of those „couples in irregular and objectively gravely sinful situations,“ who now should be admitted to the Lord’s table: